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Macroprudential policy has developed a new set of instruments for the mechanisms 
with which the state intervenes in the economy through its public administration. 
However, the global economic crisis and the need for rapid action did not allow time 
for the inclusion of macroprudential policy into the dogmatics of administrative 
law and therefore this needs to be done subsequently. This study analyses the 
legal nature of normative regulation related to macroprudential policy, the 
organisational features of the macroprudential authority and the legal appearance 
of macroprudential instruments. The final conclusion of the study is that the content 
of the public good or public goal, i.e. financial stability, to be implemented by 
macroprudential policy is extremely poorly defined. Considering the above, for the 
assessment of the achievement of financial stability, i.e. for the state control of the 
efficient fulfilment of the public goal, the regulatory environment must create an 
efficient legal guarantee system.
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1. introduction
The outbreak of the 2007 global economic crisis received considerable attention 
from both academic circles and public policy makers. Although the opinions on 
the exact causes and ‘incentives’ of the emergence of the global economic crisis 
vary (Asztalos 2009; Móczár 2010; Losoncz 2010; Stiglitz 2009; Jickling 2010; 
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Lipshaw 2011), most studies agree that its starting point was the liquidity crisis 
developing in the debt market, later leading to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, 
which is also considered to be the symbolic onset of the crisis. The bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers and other banks in turn led to regulatory interventions and 
bailouts (Brunnermeier et al. 2009:18; Kern et al. 2007). The international regulatory 
reforms identified the weakness of macroprudential regulation and supervision in 
the fact that financial organisations could increase their balance sheet together 
with their leverage without paying attention to the systemic risks building up in the 
financial system (Kern 2014; Lastra – Wood 2010). Central bankers in turn did not 
pay due attention to the close correlation between monetary policy and prudential 
regulation, and in particular to how the central bank base rate can contribute to 
the emergence of a high level of asset price bubbles and leverage in the financial 
system, which caused significant economic downturns.1
In addition to the above, until the emergence of the global economic crisis, a micro 
level approach, i.e. microprudential regulation and supervision, was the prevailing 
attitude of prudential regulation and supervision (Kálmán 2015). Microprudential 
supervision fundamentally focuses on the safe and sound functioning of individual 
financial institutions and the management of the bank’s risks, disregarding structural 
and time-related risks building up in the financial system. Macroprudential 
regulation and supervision (hereinafter jointly referred to as macroprudential 
policy) is a public task, and therefore it keeps the identification and management 
of systemic risks in view, and the conceptual framework, statutory regulation, 
organisational system and set of instruments comprising this system of objectives 
is still being formulated at present as well. The necessity to react to the global 
economic crisis quickly and efficiently, i.e. crisis legislation, results in legal issues 
falling by the wayside (temporarily) at the beginning of formulating the regulations, 
but as economic fundamentals are put in order, jurisprudence must examine the 
emerging new area of sectoral public administration of the economy and draw the 
necessary conclusions.
This brief study attempts to outline the main aspects of the administrative 
law analysis framework of macroprudential policy in view of its sectoral public 
administration nature, and summarises the initial questions of the review.
1  The close correlations between monetary policy and prudential regulation may also have remained 
undervalued because prior to the global economic crisis even monetary policy decision-makers based their 
monetary policy decisions on incorrect assessments of economic activity. See the statements of Donald 
Kohn, then-Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors at the meeting of the Federal 
Market Open Committee on 7 August 2007: ‘My forecast for the most likely outcome for output over the 
next few years is close to that of the staff–growth a little below potential for a few quarters, held down by 
the housing correction, and the unemployment rate rising a little further. (…) I see a number of reasons 
to think that moderate growth remains the most likely outcome going forward.’ See: Transcript of the 
Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on August 7, 2007, 64. http://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20070807meeting.pdf. Downloaded: 20 May 2016
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2. Administrative law analysis framework of macroprudential policy
For the administrative law analysis of macroprudential policy, or rather for 
the identification of the relevant administrative law problems, this study 
relies upon three pillars: normative regulation – created by others than the 
macroprudential authorities – concerning macroprudential policy and designating 
the macroprudential authority’s scope of action; organisational characteristics of 
the macroprudential authority, which place the macroprudential authority within 
the organisation of public administration; and finally, the legal means applied 
by macroprudential authorities to carry out their public responsibilities. Finally, 
the concept of financial stability is reviewed as the foundation of these three 
pillars; this concept essentially represents the public good to be implemented by 
macroprudential policy and at the same time the reason for economic intervention 
by the state.
2.1. Conceptual framework of macroprudential policy and its central element, 
financial stability
Explore the exact origin of the concept of macroprudence is a difficult undertaking, 
but the literature traces its creation back to the expert work going on at the Bank for 
International Settlements (hereinafter: BIS). Based on the BIS archives, Piet Clement 
revealed that the first appearance of the concept of macroprudence in international 
environment can be dated to 1979, to a meeting of the Cooke Committee, where 
experts discussed the risks inherent in the maturity of international interbank 
loans (Clement 2010:59-60). This material, however, was an internal expert 
document, and thus the concept did not appear in the public sphere. The first 
public document that expressly devoted attention to macroprudential policy was 
a report of one of the committees of the BIS (Committee on the Global Financial 
System) in 1986 (BIS 1986:233-244). It was not by chance that the issue of the 
necessity of macroprudential policy came to the fore in connection with the 
derivatives market and the risks inherent in the process of securitisation. However, 
the ‘cyclical euphoria’2 eclipsed the questions raised by experts – in parallel with the 
liberalisation and deregulation of the financial market3 – and until the early 2000s 
2  This expression originates from Raghuram G. Rajan, and describes that the belief in strict regulation is the 
strongest at the lowest point of the recession, exactly when strict regulation of market participants is not 
needed. At the peak of growth and expansion, when the chance is the highest that market participants 
take excessive risks, everyone trusts in the functioning of the self-regulating mechanisms of the market 
(Rajan 2009:397).
3  Liberalisation fundamentally means the restoration of the conditions of market economy in areas where state 
intervention reached a significant magnitude, while deregulation means the termination of the different 
regulations of the various financial sectors and financial services as well as of the ban on the interoperability 
between sectors, and in general the removal of restrictive provisions of law.
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the concept of ‘macroprudence’ arose only occasionally.4 The ‘revival’ of the concept 
is related to the speech delivered in September 2000 by Andrew Crockett, General 
Manager of the BIS and at the same time Chairman of the Financial Stability Forum 
(Crockett 2000). Crockett summarised the differences between the macroprudential 
and microprudential approaches to regulation and supervision, and expressed 
the idea that it was necessary to strengthen the macroprudential approach to 
achieve financial stability. In addition to the above developments, academic journals 
and scientific works also increasingly dealt with systemic risks and the issue of 
procyclicality of the banking system without naming it as macroprudential policy 
(Horváth et al. 2002; Mérő 2003; Mérő – Zsámboki 2003; Lúboy 2003; Rochet 2005; 
Borio 2005). The above developments reveal that although the macroprudential way 
of thinking (mostly relating to systemic risks) developed continuously, its sudden 
institutional and legislative development – appearing as part of the crisis legislation 
indicated in the introduction – was triggered by the global economic crisis.
Macroprudential policy can be defined as the use of mainly prudential tools to 
limit systemic risks and ensure the stability of the financial system (Viñals 2011). 
Taking account of the above, Lastra (2015:316) points out that it is very difficult to 
capture the macroprudential aspect. Considering the nature of the intervention 
tools, it falls somewhere between microprudential supervision and monetary 
policy.5 However, it is not always easy to draw the line between them. As for its 
goal, according to the definition by the European Systemic Risk Board (hereinafter: 
ESRB), the objective of macroprudential policy is to ‘contribute to the safeguard 
of the stability of the financial system as a whole, including by strengthening the 
resilience of the financial system and decreasing the build-up of systemic risks, 
thereby ensuring a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic 
growth.’6 The central element of the concept of macroprudential policy, and thus 
the foundation of economic intervention, is systemic risk itself and the concept of 
financial stability. According to the definition by Scott (2010:763), systemic risk is 
the risk which may destroy the national and global financial systems. Accordingly, 
the concept of systemic risk captures the contraction in the provision of financial 
services as a result of the weakening of the financial system as a whole or part 
of it, in a way that this contraction may have serious negative impacts on the 
real economy.7 The build-up and existence of systemic risks, in turn, poses a risk 
4  However, from this period it is important to underline that the concept itself left the circles of ‘central 
bankers’, and even the IMF started to use it, firstly in connection with the Southeast Asian crisis (IMF 1998:13). 
The relevant policy-type consequence was that the IMF started to develop better statistical methods for the 
examination of the vulnerability of the financial system. They were the so-called macroprudential indicators, 
which were later included in the Financial Sector Assessment Programme of the IMF (Owen et al. 2000).
5  Concerning the nature of macroprudential policy, the opinion of Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (2002:3) is 
similar to that of Lastra. In the former’s opinion, financial stability is in the field bordered by monetary 
policy and financial supervision.
6  See: Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 4 April 2013 on intermediate objectives 
and instruments of macro-prudential policy (ESRB/2013/1) (hereinafter: Recommendation ESRB/2013/1).
7  For more details on the approach to the concept of systemic risk in literature see Lublóy (2003:77-81).
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to maintaining financial stability as the ultimate goal of macroprudential policy. 
However, in connection with maintaining financial stability it is necessary to note 
that macroprudential policy does not have exclusive responsibility in this area as 
ensuring financial stability can fundamentally be decomposed into two kinds of 
processes: crisis prevention (with which macroprudential policy is fundamentally 
identifiable in the closest manner) and crisis management (which, in turn, is already 
separate from macroprudential policy).
Accordingly, the ultimate goal of macroprudential policy – within the framework 
interpreted above, distinguished from the instruments of crisis management – is to 
increase the financial system’s resilience to shocks. Consequently, macroprudential 
policy as economic management toolkit intervenes in the operation of the economy 
when it perceives threats to financial stability.8 That said, the concept of financial 
stability has extremely poorly defined – positive – content.9 In fact, financial stability 
is usually defined with a negative approach, i.e. financial stability means the lack of 
significant financial crises (Das et al. 2004:6; Lastra 2015:313). The so-called Ingves 
Report, which the BIS compiled to create a concept of financial stability for the 
implementation of the macroprudential framework to be developed within Basel 
III,10 defines at least five types of the concept on the basis of the relevant literature 
(BIS 2011). According to the definition by Glavanits (2015:84), ‘in order to achieve 
financial stability, legislative and law enforcing bodies, financial institutions and 
other financial market participants are obliged to behave in a specific way, and also 
to refrain from certain other ways of behaviour, as well as to act in cooperation with 
one another in line with the principles of good faith and honour’.
Accordingly, the uncertainty of the ultimate goal of macroprudential policy, which 
drives the functioning of the set of instruments as well, opens up the possibility 
for ex ante state intervention, intended to prevent the build-up of systemic risks, 
as well as for ex post intervention, aiming to neutralise systemic risks which have 
built up. Consequently, macroprudential policy has extremely wide discretion in 
terms of the activation of instruments.
8  The basic instruments of ‘perception’ are directly defined indicators (e.g. the loan/GDP gap, cyclical systemic 
risk map), expert evaluation and external risk assessments. With regard to Hungary, it is necessary to 
mention the system-wide financial stress index, the SWFSI, which was developed for the Hungarian financial 
system. This indicator measures the joint stress level of the Hungarian financial system’s six main segments 
(the spot foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange swap market, the secondary market of government 
bonds, the interbank unsecured forint market, the equity market and the banking segment) (Holló 2013). 
As a result of the conversion into forints, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) recently renewed the SWFSI 
(MNB 2016b).
9  However, against the background of the vague nature of the concept, it is necessary to point out that there is 
broad agreement in the literature regarding the public good, and even global public good nature of financial 
stability (Quintyn – Taylor 2002:8; Turnbull 2006).
10  The Basel III regulatory package is a complex system for the renewal of bank regulation, consisting of 
a number of elements. The most important of these are the new rules related to capital and liquidity as 
well as the additional requirements vis-à-vis systemically important financial institutions. An overview of 
the Basel III regulatory package is available at: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm?m=3%7C14%7C572. 
Downloaded: 23 April 2016 
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2.2. The normative pillar of macroprudential policy
Globalisation of the financial market made it obvious that – in parallel with market 
participants’ interconnection and integration – a regulatory framework is needed, 
which is based on uniform principles and harmonised internationally to a great 
extent (Erdős – Mérő 2010:226). Without such a framework, risky activities – based 
on the principle of less resistance – would gravitate to the regulatory environment 
where the most relaxed rules prevail and would thus weaken the efforts to manage 
systemic risks. This is the so-called regulatory arbitrage phenomenon. In order to 
eliminate this, the normative pillar of the regulation of macroprudential policy is 
implemented on three regulatory levels which are built upon one another. These 
levels are a) international, b) European Union and c) national regulations. Due to 
size limitations, this paper cannot analyse each regulatory level in detail, and thus 
in the following the focus is on the correlations between the individual levels and 
on macroprudential authorities’ leeway designated by legislation.
In connection with international macroprudential regulation, it is necessary to 
point out that it basically means the aggregate of so-called ‘soft law’ type norms11 
(standards, recommendations, resolutions, guidelines and other declarations), 
as – for lack of sovereignty and transfer of sovereignty – this regulatory level 
is – at present12 – devoid of the possibility of formulating legally binding norms 
(Brummer 2011). Due to lack of a legal requirement, it is not even possible to 
enforce by legal means the macroprudential rules that appear at the international 
level, albeit a number of international organisations – especially the IMF, the BIS 
and the Financial Stability Board – exert expert pressure on states so that they 
should include the international rules in their own respective legislation.13 The 
enforcement of ‘soft law’ type norms may be served by the market as well. Namely, 
compliance with international standards may facilitate the cheaper financing of 
sovereign debt and negotiation of more favourable terms and conditions with 
international financial institutions (Ferran – Kern 2011:6). Therefore, it is important 
to emphasise that even in absence of a legal requirement, international ‘soft law’ is 
able to have a significant impact on supranational and state regulations through its 
implementation by sovereigns – or by their supranational organisations – in their 
own respective legislation.
11  Giovanni (2000:9) observes that apart from some exceptions (e.g. IMF agreements), most international 
financial documents that relate to cross-border financial relations can be considered as ‘soft law’.
12  However, it is important to note that the regulatory elements without a legally binding nature serve the 
purpose of analysing the current conditions, but it cannot be excluded that the international level becomes 
‘statutory’ as a result of creating – through partial assignment of state sovereignty – organisations that will 
already be authorised to take legally binding decisions. The concept of Erik Denters and Rosa M. Lastra 
about setting up the World Financial Organisation can be mentioned as an example (Denters 2009, Lastra 
2014). In connection with that, the analyses published in literature regarding the emergence of international 
financial law or lex financiera can be mentioned (Lastra 2014).
13  An example for that is the World Bank’s programme that assesses the situation in the financial sectors of 
the member countries (Financial Sector Assessment Program) (Gola – Spadafora 2009).
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Within the European Union, Member States’ systemic financial risks may be 
closely interrelated; therefore, Member States’ macroprudential policies cannot 
be separated from one another. Accordingly, with adjustments complying with the 
characteristics of the European Union (Ayadi et al. 2012:1), the Basel III proposal 
package, which was elaborated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
although it appears as ‘soft law’ at the international level, was implemented in 
2013 by the Council and the European Parliament in the European Union legislation 
through the CRD IV/CRR regulatory package,14 which entered into force on 1 January 
2014.
The CRD IV/CRR is a step taken expressly in order to set up a framework for a single 
European regulation (Mérő – Piroska 2013:315), which, firstly, follows from the 
fact that the CRD IV is already a so-called maximum harmonisation directive, i.e. 
Member States must include its provisions in their own internal legal system, but 
they may not adopt stricter requirements than its provisions, and secondly, the CRR 
was issued in the form of a regulation, which has direct effect, i.e. it must be applied 
directly – without member state implementation – in the EU Member States. From 
a regulatory aspect, it is important that the CRR does not prevent institutions 
regulated by it (credit institutions and investment firms) from holding own funds 
and their components in excess of, or applying measures that are stricter than 
those required by the CRR.15 Moreover, it also allows Member States’ authorities 
to introduce stricter national measures in the case of negative changes, if systemic 
risks can be better addressed with such (the so-called flexibility clause), if there 
is no other suitable tool for their management, and using a special information 
procedure.16
In terms of formulating the macroprudential framework of the European Union, 
undoubtedly the most important new feature is the appearance in EU legislation of 
the provisions concerning the macroprudential policy of the CRD IV/CRR package 
(ESRB 2014a:4) and of the legal institutions – intervention tools – harmonised at the 
EU level and dedicated to the prevention or overcoming of the systemic risks that 
jeopardise financial stability. In connection with the provisions of the CRD IV, it is 
necessary to emphasise that the macroprudential tools contained therein exert their 
impact through member state legislation and the application of law by authorities 
relying upon that legislation. One exception from this is the European Central Bank 
(hereinafter: ECB), which – for the Member States participating in the banking 
14  See: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 
648/2012, text with EEA relevance (hereinafter: CRR); Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, text with EEA relevance (hereinafter: CRD IV).
15  Article 3, CRR
16  Article 458(2), CRR
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union – is also qualified as a macroprudential authority within the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (hereinafter: SSM). The ECB is entitled to apply the macroprudential 
tools regulated in the CRD IV/CRR.17 As opposed to the CRD IV, the CRR regulates 
macroprudential tools that the macroprudential authorities may apply directly, 
based on the CRR. In addition to the macroprudential tools applied directly on the 
basis of the CRR and the ones transposed into internal legislation, Member States 
have the right to introduce special macroprudential tools (not regulated at the EU 
level) into their national legislation in order to manage systemic risks.
Accordingly, the primary responsibility for systemic risk management and the 
use of macroprudential tools is based on the national level. Consequently, the EU 
regulation mainly prevails through macroprudential authorities’ law enforcement 
and – in Member States where the macroprudential authority is authorised to do 
so – through legislative activity.
Stemming from the aforementioned uncertainty of financial stability as the 
ultimate goal of macroprudential policy, in terms of normativity one of the most 
important questions is what decision-making mechanism is created by legislation 
for the macroprudential authorities in connection with macroprudential policy and 
thus in connection with the application of the state’s tools for intervening in the 
economy. Member State legislation can regulate the decision-making mechanisms 
between two well separable regulatory methods as two extreme values. One of the 
ends of the regulation is the determination of the so-called rules-based, while the 
other end is the determination of the discretionary decision-making mechanism 
(Agur – Sharma 2013). In the case of rules-based decision-making pre-determined 
indicators signal systemic financial risks in a pre-determined manner, based on 
which the macroprudential authority automatically applies the available tools. 
The advantage of this approach is the adequately active, more predictable and 
transparent, internationally better coordinated macroprudential policy, which is able 
to shape market expectations in a more precise manner. Compared to the rules-
based approach, in the case of discretionary regulation the use of macroprudential 
tools is at the discretion of the macroprudential authority. The advantages of this 
approach are that new knowledge and expert assessments can also be used, it 
instigates a continuous review of macroprudential policy, allows more targeted 
intervention, is more suitable for the flexible handling of unexpected events, is 
easier to limit the circumvention of regulation, and it is difficult to automatically 
carry out the management of certain systemic risks (MNB 2016a:23-24). Various 
combinations of the two operational methods can be developed, allowing a wider 
or narrower scope of discretion for the macroprudential authority. 
17  However, the ECB’s macroprudential powers can only be exercised within strict limits, as a) the SSM does 
not cover the European Union as a whole, only the euro area countries and the states participating in the 
close cooperation, b) the SSM exclusively applies to the banking sector, and c) the ECB may only apply the 
macroprudential tools regulated in the CRD IV/CRR and may not create new tools.
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In the practice that is evolving in the European Union,18 the so-called guided 
discretion principle prevails (BoE 2014; SNB 2014; ESRB 2014a), which means that 
there are rules influencing macroprudential interventions, but in specific decision-
making situations the macroprudential authority may deviate from them with 
proper justification.
In summary, in addition to designating the framework, the normative pillar of 
macroprudential policy fundamentally refers the shaping of macroprudential policy 
and the application of macroprudential (intervention) tools to the (wide-ranging) 
discretion of macroprudential authorities, in parallel with which the responsibility 
of the macroprudential authority and the effectiveness of the guarantees of the 
rule of law related to the application of macroprudential tools improve.
2.3. The organisational pillar of macroprudential policy: the macroprudential 
authority
Setting up independent agencies or independent regulatory commissions as an 
organisational response to the increasingly complicated functioning of the modern 
state has strong traditions in the USA. It can be considered an efficient organisational 
solution in certain sectors of the economy: energy, telecommunications, 
environmental protection, financial markets, etc. These independent authorities 
perform activities of the executive power by generally having (quasi) legislative 
and quasi jurisdictional powers as well. In continental European literature and in 
statutory law usually the concept of regulatory authority is applied. Regulatory 
authority, which is basically a theoretical category, is the collective term for 
administrative bodies that perform regulatory authority activity, irrespective of 
the legal status or the type of body they belong to (Lapsánszky 2014; Kovács 2009; 
Horváth 2004; Bán – Könyves 1997). ‘The essence of regulatory authority activity 
is that the body creates general rules and norms of conduct, although formally it 
is not necessarily vested with legislative competence’ (Fazekas 2015:16). The basic 
issue in connection with independent regulatory authorities is the legitimacy of 
their activity: how the competence exercised by them can be harmonised with 
the requirement of democracy. The precondition of democratic legitimacy is to 
set up the independent authority in a democratically adopted statutory provision 
in compliance with the country’s constitutional rules. The legal ground legitimises 
the creation of the body, although in itself it does not legitimise the functioning of 
the independent body and the exercise of its competence; therefore, the liability of 
the independent authority, i.e. mechanisms of accountability need to be created. 
Practically, the judicial review of the decisions of authorities is also based upon that.
Considering the above, it is necessary to briefly review in what EU frameworks the 
establishment of Member States’ macroprudential authorities started, what their 
18  It is necessary to note that the IMF also supports this approach (IMF 2014).
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main features are and what their relationship with the dogmatic framework related 
to regulatory authorities is.
In the European Union, setting up the organisation of macroprudential 
authorities is not up to the exclusive discretion of Member States’ governments 
to establish organisations, as the main requirements that determine the design 
of the organisation of the authority were determined by the ESRB. Accordingly, 
Recommendation ESRB/2011/3 (hereinafter: Recommendation)19 summarised the 
fundamental principles of the macroprudential authorisation of national authorities, 
which serve as guidance in the establishment of Member States’ macroprudential 
authorities.20 The Recommendation comprises five essential ranges of subjects: 
a) objectives, b) institutional arrangements, c) tasks, powers and instruments, d) 
transparency and accountability as well as e) independence of Member States’ 
macroprudential authorities.
In terms of the objectives, the Recommendation establishes that the ultimate 
objective of macroprudential policy is to contribute to the safeguard of the stability 
of the financial system as a whole, thereby ensuring a sustainable contribution of 
the financial sector to economic growth. It also points out that macroprudential 
policies must be pursued at the national level upon the initiative of the national 
macroprudential authority, or as a follow-up to recommendations or warnings from 
the ESRB. In addition, in terms of formulating the objectives, Recommendation 
ESRB/2013/1 provides that Member States’ macroprudential authorities are 
recommended to define and pursue intermediate objectives of macroprudential 
policy – e.g. to mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage as well as 
to limit direct and indirect exposure concentrations – for their respective national 
financial system as a whole. In terms of determining the objectives, reviewing the 
macroprudential authorities’ macroprudential policy strategies, it can be established 
that they are based on the ESRB’s recommendations to a great extent.21
Concerning institutional arrangements, the Recommendation provides that the 
authority entrusted with the conduct of macroprudential policy can be a single 
institution or a board composed of the authorities whose actions have a material 
impact on financial stability. Where a Member State designated a single institution 
as the macroprudential authority, it is recommended to ensure that the central 
bank plays a leading role in the macroprudential policy. In addition, member state 
19  Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential 
mandate of national authorities (ESRB/2011/3).
20  Based on the first assessment of the compliance with the Recommendation, the ESRB issued its report 
in June 2014. The report concluded that seven Member States, including Hungary, fully comply with the 
Recommendation, seventeen Member States mostly comply, while five Member States partially comply 
with it. The survey covered Norway as well (ESRB 2014b). The report established that the implementation 
procedure of the Recommendation was basically successful, although further improvements were still 
needed; therefore, the assessment process would be restarted in 2016.
21  Without attempting to be exhaustive: MNB 2016; CBM 2015; BoP 2015; BoS 2015; BoI 2014.
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regulation should provide for the frameworks of cross-border cooperation and of 
the provision of information prior to the major macroprudential decisions of the 
ESRB.
The text of the Recommendation states that Member States enjoy wide-ranging 
freedom during the setting up of the institutional framework. According to the 
macroprudential authorities that were set up, Member States can be classified into 
two main groups. The first group comprises those states where macroprudential 
responsibility is shared by several institutions, and typically a coordinative council 
or committee is created for harmonising the relevant responsibilities. The other 
group includes the states where the implementation of macroprudential policy 
is transferred to the powers of an authority, which may be the central bank (in 
addition to conducting the monetary policy) or (in addition to the microprudential 
supervisory tasks) the supervisory authority, or the Ministry of Finance in the case 
of Denmark, which is an exception (ASC 2014:11). Regarding the powers of the 
macroprudential authority, based on the analysis carried out by the ESRB Advisory 
Scientific Committee, it can be concluded that two thirds are exercised by Member 
State central banks, i.e. the rules concerning central bank independence apply to 
a considerable portion of macroprudential authorities, as described below (ASC 
2014).
Concerning its powers, a Member State’s macroprudential authority should have 
powers at least for the identification, monitoring and assessment of the risks to 
financial stability and for the implementation of policies to achieve its objectives 
regarding the prevention and mitigation of those risks. The macroprudential 
authority should have adequate instruments in order to achieve its objectives. With 
the entry into force of the CRR and implementation of the CRD IV, the requirements 
included in the Recommendation show the highest compliance in terms of content, 
as based on these legal acts the fundamental macroprudential tools are available 
for the macroprudential authorities, and they are obliged to designate a member 
state macroprudential authority for the application of these tools.
In terms of transparency, the Recommendation states that the member 
state regulation should ensure the highest level of transparency. Therefore, 
macroprudential policy decisions and their motivations should be made public 
in a timely manner, unless there are risks to financial stability in doing so, and 
the macroprudential authority should be entrusted with the power to make 
public and private statements on systemic risk. Concerning accountability, the 
Recommendation provides that the macroprudential authority is ultimately 
accountable to the national parliament.
The mechanisms that ensure the public and clear communication of transparency 
and macroprudential decisions should be considered as the framework of the 
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operational independence of Member States’ macroprudential authorities. In 
Member States’ practice, macroprudential authorities’ operations are typically 
subordinated to the national parliament; and democratic control over these bodies 
or institutions is reflected in the public character of the parliament. A typical solution 
is the macroprudential authorities’ annual – or in certain cases more frequent – 
reporting before parliament and the competent parliamentary committee.
Clear communication of macroprudential policy intentions may improve the 
transmission mechanism of macroprudential tools either if the macroprudential 
authority took measures or failed to do so (Giese et al. 2013). In addition to 
increasing the efficiency of the transmission mechanism, communication facilitates 
the development of general agreement, and may strengthen market discipline in 
relation to the fact that macroprudential measures are needed. It may indicate 
that the authority is able to handle market problems, and thus may strengthen 
its legitimacy and at the same time the accountability of macroprudential policy. 
The most important element of the communication of macroprudential policy – 
seen in Member States’ practice – is the publication of financial stability reports. 
These reports are typically comprehensive documents that provide an overview 
and analysis of the various aspects of financial stability. They usually begin with 
a comprehensive assessment of financial stability concerning the given country, 
often including the international context as well (Born et al. 2010). The stability 
reports are complemented by press releases, policy statements, background notes 
and frequently asked questions.
Finally, the Recommendation states that Member States’ macroprudential 
authorities should be operationally independent, i.e. it should be ensured that 
organisational and financial arrangements do not jeopardise the conduct of 
macroprudential policy. Moreover, central banks entrusted with macroprudential 
mandates should be independent in the sense of Article 130 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter: TFEU). The Recommendation 
provides so in spite of the fact that the independence of macroprudential authorities 
as supervisory bodies is not the equivalent of central bank independence.
As highlighted above, in many Member States the macroprudential authorities are 
the respective central banks of the given Member State. Accordingly, in their case 
the level of independence determined in the TFEU is achieved from the outset. 
However, where the macroprudential authority is not the central bank of the 
given Member State, as is also underlined by the ESRB (2014b:17), the principle 
of operational independence is breached in several cases, as the government has 
a significant impact on decision-making.
In summary, with regard to macroprudential authorities it needs to be underlined 
that both the recommendations of the ESRB and Member States’ practices point 
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to the solution that in terms of their legal status macroprudential authorities 
should become strongly similar to central banks. Consequently, legislators grant 
macroprudential powers primarily to Member States’ central banks as a matter of 
routine. However, if the central bank is given a greater role in the financial stability 
framework, especially if its role in the regulation of non-bank financial institutions 
as well as in the creation and implementation of macroprudential tools increases, 
these powers have to be complemented with the expansion and reinforcement 
of the efficient mechanisms of transparency and accountability (Duff 2014:207).
Ensuring accountability and transparency with regard to monetary policy is relatively 
simple. The primary objective of monetary policy is to restrain inflation, i.e. to 
achieve and maintain price stability, which is easy to quantify (see the comparison 
of the consumer price index to the central bank’s inflation target), and the primary 
instrument of achieving this objective, i.e. setting the central bank base rate, is 
relatively easy to understand. The measurability of the level of price stability makes 
the accountability of the central bank more simple and thus mitigates concerns 
related to ensuring independence and stemming from the lack of democratic 
legitimacy (Goodhart 2011:6-7). In a theoretical sense, it is much more difficult to 
attain the same level of accountability in the case of the macroprudential authority. 
As opposed to price stability, financial stability is difficult to assess on the basis 
of one single indicator, as there is no consensus even concerning its concept, 
as elaborated in detail above, and there is no – general agreement-based and 
scientifically substantiated – indicator as in the case of inflation.22 It is especially 
difficult to evaluate financial stability during the operation of the macroprudential 
authority ex ante, i.e. before a financial crisis occurs, because macroprudential 
policy is primarily of preventive nature, i.e. it aims at the prevention of the 
emergence of a financial crisis.
Accordingly, the normative pillar of macroprudential policy provides wide-
ranging discretion for macroprudential authorities in the course of implementing 
macroprudential policy, which is supported by the organisational pillar with ample 
independence from the government, with the fact that in terms of content – due 
to the uncertainty of the point of reference or benchmark – the mechanism of 
accountability is limited to the accountability of the macroprudential authority.
22  In this regard, the most detailed analysis was carried out in the institution called Office of Financial Research 
set up by the US Dodd-Frank Act, where 31 quantitative index numbers were identified that are used in 
the literature to measure financial stability (Bisias et al. 2012).
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2.4. Essential means of implementing macroprudential policy
For the transparent application of macroprudential instruments, macroprudential 
authorities must elaborate their respective macroprudential policy strategies.23 
Macroprudential policy strategy can be interpreted as a concentric process. 
In the first stage, the risks have to be identified and analysed. During that, the 
macroprudential authorities map the vulnerable points of the financial system 
with the help of the relevant indicators. In the second stage, an ex ante impact 
assessment of the tools that can be applied is performed, and then the tools are 
selected and calibrated, and consultations prior to the application of the tools are 
conducted. In the third stage, macroprudential authorities activate and make public 
the macroprudential tools. Finally, in the fourth stage, they continuously monitor 
and evaluate the impacts of the tools used, and by channelling these experience 
back, the strategic process is restarted (Fáykiss – Szombati 2013).
Compilation of the tools of the macroprudential authority is a priority area of 
the macroprudential policy strategy. Theoretically, a wide-ranging toolkit may be 
available to achieve macroprudential objectives. These tools can be microprudential 
instruments calibrated at the system level, other regulatory instruments, fiscal 
policy instruments (such as various taxes or charges) or new instruments, 
expressly developed for macroprudential purposes. Due to the short ‘history’ of 
macroprudential policy, the individual tools – used for macroprudential purposes 
– are mostly in the experimental phase, and thus under development.
In the literature, the individual elements of the macroprudential toolkit are 
systematised according to various aspects. Viñals (2011:22-23) draws a distinction 
between instruments which were expressly designed for handling the time-related 
and structural dimensions of systemic risks (e.g. the countercyclical capital buffer) 
and instruments that originally were not created for the handling of systemic risks, 
but can be calibrated at system level as well (e.g. the LTV and LTI ratios). From 
the aspect of the vulnerability of the financial system, Hoogduin et al. (2010:4) 
differentiate among instruments that manage risks stemming from leverage (e.g. 
the macroprudential leverage ratio), instruments that manage liquidity and market 
risks (e.g. security deposit ratio) and instruments that manage the risks stemming 
from interrelationship (e.g. concentration ceilings). Monroe et al. (2010:13) make 
a distinction between instruments that have an impact on the assets side of the 
balance sheet and the ones with an impact on the liabilities side. In the Hungarian 
literature, Szombati (2013) differentiates among the instruments for limiting 
systemic liquidity risks (e.g. liquidity ratios, maturity mismatch rules), instruments 
23  Macroprudential policy strategies are adopted by the European Union’s macroprudential authorities in 
various forms. Many of the macroprudential authorities issue documents that are not binding legally, and 
thus do not have any normative force. See, for example, MNB 2016a; BoS 2015. Some macroprudential 
authorities, however, lay down their respective macroprudential strategies in normative acts with a legal 
bond. See, for example, Directive No. 11. on macro-prudential policy, Central Bank of Malta.
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for reducing procyclical banking sector behaviour (e.g. the countercyclical capital 
buffer), instruments that limit excessive credit outflows (e.g. LTV and PTI ratios) 
and instruments that reduce the probability of default of systemically important 
institutions (e.g. limits concerning the balance sheet total).
In parallel with the aspects of the grouping applied in the literature, for a practical 
overview of the set of instruments, the systematisation of instruments is approached 
from the objective of macroprudential policy.24 The ultimate goal of macroprudential 
policy is to promote the stability of the financial system as a whole and to facilitate 
its preservation, thus contributing to economic growth in a sustainable manner on 
behalf of the financial sector.25 On the basis of specific market failures jeopardising 
financial stability, this ultimate goal can be decomposed into intermediate objectives 
for a clearer classification and calibration of the macroprudential instruments. 
Pursuant to Recommendation ESRB/2013/1, the intermediate objectives of 
macroprudential policy have to focus on at least: a) mitigating and preventing 
excessive credit growth and leverage; b) mitigating and preventing excessive 
maturity mismatch and market illiquidity; c) limiting direct and indirect exposure 
concentrations; d) limiting the systemic impact of misaligned incentives with 
a view to reducing moral hazard, and e) strengthening the resilience of financial 
infrastructures. Based on the so-called Tinbergen Rule, at least one successful 
instrument is needed for the achievement of each intermediate objective (Tinbergen 
1952). It is important to indicate, however, that in practice the efficient functioning 
of macroprudential policy requires the availability of complementary instruments 
for the macroprudential authority, mitigating by this as well the phenomenon of 
regulatory arbitrage and the uncertainties related to the transmission mechanism. 
Without examining the individual instruments of macroprudential policy in detail 
(Claessens 2014; BoE 2011), Annex 1 summarises the most widespread instruments 
that are suitable for the achievement of the individual intermediate objectives.
Therefore, as laid down above, macroprudential instruments are official authority 
type acts meant to handle the findings – the financial stability risks – of the 
macroprudential authority’s system-level supervision activity (market surveillance 
activity in line with administrative law dogmatics).26 It is important to note that the 
so-called market surveillance powers are wider than the usual control-supervision 
powers (of authorities) to the extent that their exercising and the data provision 
requirements are not necessarily tied to the control of individual resolutions by 
24  As the ESRB puts it: ‘Identifying intermediate objectives makes macro-prudential policy more operational, 
transparent and accountable and provides an economic basis for the selection of instruments.’ See: Par. 
5, Recommendation ESRB/2013/1.
25  As the MNB’s macroprudential strategy puts it: ‘The ultimate objective of macroprudential policy is to 
mitigate excessive systemic financial risks. This means that it should strive to prevent severe financial crises 
and minimise their effects on the real economy if they nevertheless arise.’ (MNB 2016a:4)
26  The administrative law concept and theoretical basis of market surveillance is most generally related to the 
– economic – interventions by the state necessary in the area of liberalised market public services, including 
financial services, to the administration of economic competition and consumer protection administration.
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authorities, the control of compliance with legislation or to one single client (Kovács 
2008:27).27 In terms of dogmatics, among administrative types of activities, market 
surveillance is an independent, definable type of special official supervision that 
has specific conceptual and content elements (Lapsánszky 2012). As regards the 
theoretical bases, market surveillance can also be divided into two parts: a) market 
surveillance investigation and b) market surveillance powers that can be applied as 
a result of the investigation.
Market surveillance powers are filled with content by the macroprudential policy 
toolkit, which, theoretically, has an impact on the financial intermediary system as 
a whole, but practically only on the banking sector, and whose regulatory impact on 
the economy must be underlined. However, in connection with the macroprudential 
policy toolkit it needs to be pointed out that – in view of its systemic impacts – 
the instruments prevail through normative acts as well as individual acts of public 
authority in the law of European Union Member States. It is typical of normative 
instruments that they exclude the right of legal remedy against the act, while 
the guarantee rules of legislative procedure are effective. At the same time, the 
application of macroprudential instruments typically takes place through normative 
acts, which can be issued by macroprudential authorities. In view of the practice 
based upon operative legislation, normative acts consist of legislation by decree 
and so-called general resolutions, which do not have a specific addressee.28 The 
relationship of these two types of acts with the right of legal remedy, or more 
precisely the prejudice to the right of legal remedy raises important legal questions 
in connection with macroprudential policy and macroprudential instruments.
3. Closing thoughts
The public task – global public good – to be realised by macroprudential policy is 
the contribution maintaining financial stability, which fundamentally materialises 
in the development of the financial system’s resilience to shocks as well as in the 
prevention of the build-up of systemic risks that jeopardise financial stability. In 
this sense, the attitude of macroprudential policy is ex ante compared to the ex 
post nature of the set of instruments of crisis management. Of course, in addition 
to other players – the provision of extraordinary liquidity assistance by the central 
bank or the deposit insurance or resolution systems in extreme cases – the 
27  In this respect, the administrative law concept of market surveillance covers a wider range than the concept 
of market conduct used in the financial regulatory literature, which comprises the supervision of the fair, 
regular operation of financial markets and of capital market participants’ fair customer management and 
investment behaviour in line with their authorisations (de Haan – Oosterloo – Schoenmaker 2015:420-421).
28  With regard to provisions of general nature see: Provision of a general nature on setting the countercyclical 
capital buffer rate for the Czech Republic No. IV/2015 of 3 December 2015. (Czech Republic); general 
resolution available at: https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/srb-altalanos-hatarozat-20151118-hu.pdf (20 May 
2016) (Hungary). For regulation by decrees see Règlement CSSF N° 16-02 sur la fixation du taux de coussin 
contracyclique pour le second trimestre 2016 (Luxembourg); Finansinspektionen’s regulations regarding 
the countercyclical buffer rate (Sweden); Décision n°D-HCSF-2016-2 du 1er avril 2016 relative au taux du 
coussin de fonds propres contracyclique (France).
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macroprudential authority also plays a role in crisis management. However, the 
content of the public good or public goal to be attained by macroprudential policy 
is extremely loosely specified, allowing for wide-ranging discretion. Consequently, 
the evaluation of its materialisation, i.e. the efficient attainment of public good is 
an extremely difficult task. The unclarified nature of the fundamentals that allows 
wide-ranging discretion entails the issues of the scope and depth of statutory 
regulation, as the guarantee regulation of law and its feature that it assigns scopes 
of responsibilities may be able to fill these gaps.
However, the normative side of macroprudential policy, i.e. the setting up of the 
legal framework, further widens the scope of discretion, which is not limited by 
organisational regulation either, as it typically ensures extremely wide operational 
independence to the macroprudential authority. Where the rule of law prevails, the 
disputability of macroprudential decisions as public administrational or economic 
management acts – which inevitably entail legal effects as well – may create the 
legal control of these bodies and the legal protection of the members of the 
society through the right to legal remedy. However, following from their nature, 
macroprudential decisions exert their legal impact on the financial intermediary 
system as a whole (or at least to its part that carries systemic risk) simultaneously, 
relating to an open circle of addressees, and in practice it is typically realised 
through normative acts. It also means that the public administrational acts of 
macroprudential policy generally cannot be challenged by legal remedy; at most they 
can be subjected to a procedure of control of legislative standards. In a procedure 
of control of legislative standards, the competent authorities (constitutional court, 
ordinary court), basically carrying out a formal control of legislative standards, may 
examine the authorisation to create statutory instruments and the compliance with 
the scope of the authorisation. In addition, where applicable, the inquiry may also 
cover the permissibility of limiting fundamental rights in the case of a collision of 
the application of the macroprudential instrument with other fundamental rights, 
e.g. ownership. In the case of individual, authority type decisions of macroprudential 
policy the right to legal remedy prevails formally, typically through judicial reviews, 
stemming from the operational independence of the macroprudential authority. 
However, as a result of the extremely wide scope of discretion, the review activity of 
the court aiming at the legality of the decision may raise doubts in connection with 
its substance and efficiency. Considering the above and the prevailing regulations, 
the legal control of macroprudential authorities can be considered rather formal 
and not as one that provides efficient legal protection for those affected by the 
decisions.
The global economic crisis and the necessity for rapid action – crisis legislation 
– did not allow time for setting up the guarantee-related legal framework of 
macroprudential policy. The demand for financial stability as global public good 
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is fundamentally a public task to be carried out within national frameworks (or in 
a partly regional one in the case of the European Union). It became interpretable 
within the framework of macroprudential policy following the global economic 
crisis, irrespective of the cross-border nature of systemic risks. Local implementation 
of the global public good may inevitably result in tensions, and it also raises 
efficiency questions with regard to macroprudential policy, but these must be the 
subject of further analysis. Statutory regulation must react to the wide scope of 
discretion of the macroprudential authority, and it is necessary to develop the 
mechanisms that still appear in statutory regulation only in a narrow scope, but play 
a major role in the communication and practice of macroprudential authorities, and 
ensure the legality and responsibility for decisions of the public authority activity 
of public administration.
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1. Mitigating and preventing excessive credit growth and leverage
a) countercyclical capital buffer
b) sectoral capital requirements
c) macroprudential leverage ratio
d) LTV, LTI/DSTI requirements
e) capital conservation buffers
2. Mitigating and preventing excessive maturity mismatch and market illiquidity
a) macroprudential limitations related to sources of funding (net stable financing ratio)
b) liquidity ratios
c) other macroprudential limits
d) security deposit and haircut requirements
3. Limiting the concentration of indirect and direct risk positions
a) limiting large open positions
b) various capital-based instruments
4. Limiting the systemic impact of misaligned incentives with a view to reducing moral hazard
a) additional capital requirement for systemically important financial institutions
5. Strengthening the resilience of financial infrastructure
a) deposit guarantee schemes
b) increased disclosure requirements
c) structural systemic risk buffer
